Bloggers bucking the Brotherhood in Egypt

by By Daniel Williams Bloomberg News ,
Published: October 28, 2008

CAIRO: Abdel Moneim Mahmoud once organized student elections, collected donations and educated chicken breeders about the dangers of bird flu as an operative for the Muslim Brotherhood. That all ended after he criticized Egypt's controversial Islamic political group on his blog, Ana-Ikhwan (I Am Brotherhood).
Mahmoud, 28, condemned its opposition to women and Christians holding high office in Egypt, including the presidency. He also questioned its slogan, "Islam is the answer" - a rallying cry of associated groups and imitators across the Islamic world - for implying that religious scripture should be the primary criterion for political action.
Brotherhood officials told Mahmoud to stop blogging or drop out of the organization. While he suspended active participation, he still considers himself a member. He is also unrepentant.
"The youth of the Muslim Brotherhood used to listen and obey," he says. "Some leaders don't like it, but we don't keep quiet."
Mahmoud is part of a new generation of Islamic-oriented bloggers in the Middle East whose willingness to air internal matters online has created as much of a stir as their opinions, says Diaa Rashwan, an analyst here at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.

What's new is this launching pad used by young people: the blog," he says. "They are loyal to the Brotherhood, but believe in open debate."
Until recently, political blogging in Egypt was largely the domain of secular democracy activists who reported on strikes and torture and promoted protests against the 26-year rule of President Hosni Mubarak. Brotherhood bloggers took their cue from those campaigners, says Mahmoud, a reporter for the independent, non-Islamic newspaper Al Dustour.
Two years ago, some Brothers, mainly in their 20s, began detailing the arrests and torture by the police of their own members. Some also turned to criticizing the Brotherhood itself. They released details of a draft political platform now being discussed internally that includes the ban on women and Christians leading a Muslim-majority country.
"We don't think these activities are harmful," says Magdi Saad, 30, marketing manager for a real-estate company who runs the blog Yalla Mesh Mohem (It Doesn't Matter). "We think we put a human face on the Brotherhood. The leaders were shocked."
Discipline has long been the watchword for the 80-year-old group. Public airing of internal debates was considered off limits, and membership lists and training information are veiled from public view, partly because Brothers have been perpetually subject to imprisonment.
During part of its history, members preached violent struggle against the government. In 1974, under the influence of what was then its younger generation, it disowned bloodshed, except in the case of armed action against the U.S.-led occupation in Iraq and by Palestinian groups including Hamas against Israel.
The Brotherhood is a model for Hamas and other Islamic political organizations such as the Islamic Action Front in Jordan. Unlike Hamas, it is not on the list of terrorist organizations compiled by the U.S. State Department.
Although Egypt's government legally bars the Brotherhood from politics, it is the country's largest opposition force. The group, which estimates its membership at more than one million, won 88 of 454 parliamentary seats in Egypt's 2005 elections by running candidates as independents.
Mahmoud and Saad have been jailed on occasion for their involvement in the Brotherhood, but they seem unafraid that their public exposure on the Web puts them in further danger. During interviews in public places, they spoke without looking over their shoulders. Such conversations were considered risky, even in private, a few years ago.
"The government knows who we are anyway," Mahmoud says.
Mustafa al-Naggar, 29, a dentist, says: "The government is happy to characterize us as a secretive organization; we don't want to play that game." In his Waves in a Sea of Change blog, he wrote, "It is not shameful to revise our ideas or change our positions." He also has suggested that members as young as 30 be considered in selecting Brotherhood leaders, instead of 40, which is now the case.
The Brotherhood acknowledges that blogging has created a division of opinion in the organization. Abdel Moneim Aly el-Barbary, a physician and high official, monitors the bloggers and estimates their number at about 150. He says he belongs to the faction that supports them; still, he wants them to avoid attacking personalities, be polite and keep their critiques positive.
It is better for members to air disagreements than let them fester in private, says Barbary, 55, who adds that restrictions should apply only to sensitive organizational issues such as finances. He also says blogging permits Brotherhood officials to see what the rank-and-file is thinking, since the leaders are frequently jailed and meetings of more than five people generally require permission under Egyptian law. "We have to adapt to modern times," he says.

Ali Abdul-Fattah, 50, another Brotherhood official, says it is common knowledge that members disagree on lots of subjects. Still, he opposes the trend.
"The bloggers have to be guided," he says. "The Brotherhood is immune from a split, but we don't want them to portray disunity."
Notwithstanding the youthful critiques, he says the Brotherhood's guidance committee, effectively its central board of elders, is firmly in charge. Asked whether the measure that prohibits women and Christians from the Egyptian presidency might be deleted from the final political platform, Abdul-Fattah says no.
"That won't change," he says. "Some things are fundamental."

http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/10/28/mideast/letter.php

The Muslim Brotherhood Today Interview with Amr Hamzawy

The political scene in Egypt is taking a hasty course towards a great deadlock, largely because of the ruling regime autocratic practices which is destroying any real opportunity for meaningful political participation, relying solely on its powerful security apparatus to crush its political opponents. Moreover, the current partisan life is witnessing an unbalanced competitiveness between the regime with its monopoly over power on one hand and the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest and strongest opposition group, on the other hand. The latter is actually heading towards minimizing its political and social roles giving way for a backpedaling on the political Islamic discourse, while the United States trying to open channels of a dialogue with all political powers in order to secure stability of its interests in the region.

Dr. Amr Hamzawy, a senior researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in Washington, DC, who recently visited Egypt to discuss his research paper on the draft of the Muslim Brotherhood party program.


What is your opinion regarding the recent appointment of five new members to the Muslim Brotherhood"s Executive Bureau?

Hamzawy: In order for us to clearly analyze the way these five members were appointed to the Executive Bureau, I should first point out that the MB is going through a state of strategic disarray. Despite of the Group attempts to move forward, it is actually moving backward, starting from how it tackled the so called “militia case “incident that took place at Al-Azhar University, and the bizarre confusion in the discourse it adopted in its unconvincing reaction to this incident. Add to this the undemocratic state of rows inside the Group over the proposed party platform and how it backed away from earlier commitment to continue discussions with the elite. However, in less than a year after the MB released its draft version it refuses to take part in discussions around its platform, most recently a seminar at the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies in which the MB declined to participate

The MB confusion was also evident during the latest municipal elections when it first announced it will field candidates and the MB Chairman stated that the elections are a kind of jihad, to only announce a day later that it is withdrawing from the elections urging supporters to boycott the voting process. This state of public confusion and ambivalence is certainly unjustified even if we take into consideration the pressure the Group is under from security apparatus and the government.

As for the internal elections within the Brotherhood Executive Bureau; it’s notable that the five elected members have mainly organizational roles inside the group, however, all of them have limited political awareness since they did not take part in the public work in professional unions or developed coordinated ties with political parties, except for Dr Mohamed Saad El Katatni who has recently delved into this field after the 2005 parliamentary elections.

Therefore, the choice of these five members in particular and their background clearly indicate that the Muslim Brotherhood Executive Bureau, the highest decision making-body within the MB, will be focusing more on the organizational aspects inside the group rather than its public role and its relationship with the society, which was probably the reason to exclude a prominent public figure such as Dr. Essam El-Erian.

We should link this confusion with the political milieu within the group which has three main elements:

First: The current repressive political atmosphere in Egypt which is aiming at isolating and neutralizing the MB politically and relies on heavy handed security measures in dealing with it.

Second: The political participation, according to the group, is yielding very little benefits at a high cost in the absence of any incentives, which makes MB doubt participation.

Third: Any organization in the world has a moment in which their members-amidst political tension- become obsessed and fear losing their organization’s foundation. The legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood presence is the legitimacy of its social presence. Therefore, there is seemingly a view of the conservative wing in the Muslim Brotherhood calling for necessarily returning to legitimacy attitudes, backpedaling on the political reform discourse. The group has been criticized in 2004 and 2005 for caring for the political work at the expense of the Da"wa "missionary" work and calling for applying Sharia laws.

Aside from your objective assessment of the party platform, don’t you consider it in general a step forward into becoming more engaged with public work?

Hamzawy: This is actually a debated issue among observers whether or not coming up with party platform is in itself a positive step. I personally believe that there are four motives that made the Group present its party program:

First: Its attempt to positively deal with a surrounding tense political atmosphere created by the Group’s political initiatives in 2005, which resulted in escalating pressure by government to a point where the MB found itself pulling back and lost its ability for strategic maneuvering. Therefore, the MB was in need for something positive to get out of state of negative atmosphere created by the daily news of arrests among MB member, Al-Azar mishap and the subsequent military trials which became the dominant stories circulating about the MB.

Second: It is an attempt from the group to address concerns by the civil society about its attitude towards democracy especially following its considerable interaction with the public in 2005

Third: contradictory to the second element, is addressing the Group base by trying to send two messages: first, is that the group is adhering to its core principles expressed by the slogan "Islam is the solution" which emphasize on the role of religion in the public life and the relation between religion and politics. The second message is to assure the MB base that the Group is not only a political movement but also a missionary movement", and this is where the confusion within this program.

Fourth: Addressing a third party which is the West with its governmental “think tanks” and designated researchers. The group tried to send messages of assurance to the West which sided with the regime.

But doesn"t this program reflect a phased political awareness?

Hamzawy: The program does not reflect a phased reform or change because it has emerged during a critical moment to end debates by taking retrogressive attitudes as compared with the group"s reformist discourse that appeared in the 2004 initiative of reform and 2005 election program.

This is the problem of the political Islam groups’ double attitude approach, reformist moderate attitude and the more conservative one. However, from looking at the contents of the MB political party platform that this internal strive has been settled to the benefit of the conservative side at the expense of moderate attitudes.

How does the presence of these different trends affect the final decisions made within the MB?

Hamzawy: The Muslim Brotherhood has three distinct generations:
The first is older generation or the “old guard”, although I don’t prefer to use that term which is not tweaked in public life and is anxiously seeking to preserve the organization’s and its views are generally conservative.

The second generation is the 70s generation, includes Dr. Abdel Monem Abul Fotouh and Dr. Essam El-Erian. This generation understands its public role within society and is also their role within the Group. It adopts reformist views although it isn"t the dominant power inside the movement.

The third generation is the youth, which is mistakenly viewed by the media as reformists but in reality it is a very small part of them is indeed reformists while the majority are conservative.

So, overall, the organization is made up of these three generations that share common dominant conservative trend, however, the second and third generations are dotted with a weak and marginalized reformist voices.

In this case, can we bet on the Muslim Brotherhood- being the biggest opposition group- to create a change in the Egyptian political life or at least strike a strong balance in the society?

Hamzawy: Many observers and those concerned with the future of Egypt though to bet on the Muslim Brotherhood at some point.

All of us seek alternative powers that may strike a balance. Any political life run by only one doer is unbalanced. The reality on the ground in Egypt is heading towards Tawreeth "a hereditary transfer of power", and restricting people"s freedoms through extending the emergency law and the expected anti- terrorism law.

Looking at the public action map in Egypt, we find that the Muslim Brotherhood is the most important opposition movement in Egypt, the most active and organized, which can actually be translated into a political weight during elections. However, I think betting on the Group, although legitimate, is rather wrong for the following reasons:

First: It is difficult to bet on the MB public role at a moment when it seems more inclined to focus on its internal issues, moving away from public action.

Second: Under the current pressures, the Group is actually eroding the democratic movement in Egypt because its options, through its program and the clear retreat in civil citizenship ideas, are undemocratic

Third: by betting on the Group, we are asking it to do what is beyond its capacity while security pressures are expanding in illegal and unconstitutional ways, and while the group is questioning the benefits of participating in the public work.

There is another level of analysis which in context of the coming scenario of hereditary transfer of power. The ruling elite will need a kind of compromise with main powers in the society when the moment of change comes. Will the Muslim Brotherhood be ready for this compromise? This will depend on what the elite will be willing to offer the Muslim Brotherhood.

The group has somehow escalated its discourse against the hereditary transfer of power through the MB chairman"s statements. It may be involving itself in the framework in a bid to get gains that may include easing security pressure. By this analysis, the MB will have a role and I think it will not refuse a partial compromise as long the offered price will be acceptable.

Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood"s relation with the West, where do you see these relations, if any, are heading after the Islamists’ impressive show in parliamentary elections in Egypt and Palestine which resulted, as some argues, into US backtracking from democracy promotion in the Middle East?

Hamzawy: During the 2005 parliamentary elections in Egypt, the US administration predicted that the Muslim Brotherhood will garner 10%, which wasn’t something the Administration would give too much attention as long as its allied regime will keep a majority, let alone the limited effect of the People"s Assembly on the political decision making process in Egypt.

The US administration through its embassy in Egypt, was showing some interest in the Muslim Brotherhood and the way it was thinking, especially since 2004. This interest increased even further after the Muslim Brotherhood garnered 20% of the parliament seats, and with the evolution of its political discourse and introduction of its initiatives for reform. Moreover, the US felt a desire by the Group to open channels for dialogue by launching its English website, Ikhwanweb, and signals in articles by Khairat Al Shater [MB Deputy Chairman] like the one “No need to be afraid of us" published in the Guardian in 2005.

The Bush administration was distinctly differentiating between violent movements and the Muslim Brotherhood. This distinction became even clearer after the 911 attacks, after which the US administration tried to open channels of dialogue with nonviolent Islamist groups.

The problem was not in the image of the Muslim Brotherhood as a peaceful or violent movement. The main problem was in the regional presence of the group in the region of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The administration knows very well that the Muslim Brotherhood"s activities in Egypt are peaceful but it knows also that the Muslim Brotherhood supports Palestine’s Hamas (an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood) and this is the point at which the Muslim Brotherhood"s discourse- of justifying resistance- is different from the US discourse.

The Muslim Brotherhood sensed the positive US pressing for democracy in Egypt despite the feeling that the US discourse is lying and that America was occupying Iraq but there were real lines of contact.

However, in 2008 all this changed when Bush administration took hands-off approach after Hamas ascent to power in Palestine, the United States reverted back to ally itself with rulers in the region especially in Egypt and Jordan. The US official interest in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood faltered and the Administration gave a blind eye to the flagrant security violations against the MB and other political powers in general.

The scenario of change in Egypt has become a highly anticipated issue domestically and probably regionally for its implications on neighboring countries in particular and the Arab world in general. What is your assessment for the overall climate of change in Egypt and the possible scenarios of power succession?

Hamzawy: There is media hype in Egypt about the hereditary power transfer from President Mubarak to his son Gamal.

I believe the regime will deal with the transfer of power in a constitutional way like what happened from the July revolution.

The regime has three possible scenarios:

First: Direct transfer of power to Gamal Mubarak, which requires a state of social calm and easing up the Security [State Security Investigators] grip, because Gamal is popularly rejected and he can"t assume office under current mounting political and social tensions.
Second scenario is a military alternative, especially if the social pressure persists. The regime may seek a nominee from within the military establishment who would maintain its control over Egypt. This nominee might be Omar Suleiman, head of the Egyptian National Intelligence, or an unknown figure while Gamal Mubarak maintains his political role.

Third: a yet-to be known civil substitute: a figure from the general secretariat of the National Democratic party may be promoted to carry out this role. He may be a compromise especially under social tensions and demands for ending the military control over the country.

Who will agree on these scenarios?

Hamzawy: The ruling elite, which fears nothing other the pressure created by society, not the Muslim Brotherhood, not the civil society, intellectuals, or political parties.

Is there any agreement among these ruling elite?

Hamzawy: The three scenarios I just mentioned are based on the fact that there are some sort of agreement among the elite, and that there are no internal conflicts although there are factions. However, I think that the ruling elite are still united because they are still obsessed with their interests.

What is the most likely scenario in your opinion?

Hamzawy: Knowing how unpopular the NDP is, I believe that the military scenario is the most plausible. The public strongly rejects the power succession even if it will mean a president from a civilian institution. Moreover, the military establishment is regarded by many Egyptians as a nationalist and neutral institution that is still capable of restoring law and order when the government fails as it was the case during the bread crisis. Compared with the NDP businessmen and their monopoly of power, I believe the public will favor a president outside this circle.

What about the US role in the hereditary transfer of power?

Hamzawy: In my opinion, it is a mistake for the U.S. not to formulate a clear stance regarding the power transfer issue, which could be because of the U.S. desire to maintain its strategic relation with ruling regime to protect its vital interests in the region
Therefore, the United States has relations with all Egyptian establishments, including Omar Suleiman, Jamal Mubarak"s protégées. It also talks with the old bureaucrats inside the party and the security apparatus mainly the SSI (State Security Investigators). However, the United States is worried over the succession scenarios since it is difficult to predict which one is going to become reality especially under mounting social tensions. It is not case as it was decades ago when the line of succession was fairly known ahead of time, from Nasser to Sadat then Mubarak. But at the end, I believe the United States will support whatever serves its interests.


Is there a fourth scenario, a popular role for example?

Hamzawy: There is no popular scenario. All powers are with or against the three scenarios and the ensuing benefits. However, there is a danger regardless of who is the coming president of Egypt because for the first time in Egypt’s history, since the July Revolution, the coming president will lack legitimacy. This means that the president will be weak in the midst of an autocratic arena, an environment which will consolidate the influence of security apparatus to help him impose his legitimacy.

Ikhwanweb’s Cairo Office Chief Khaled Hamza Arrested from Street

An Egyptian state security force, backed by a huge number of special forces, arrested Khaled Hamza, the manager of the Cairo office of Ikhwanweb, the Muslim Brotherhood"s official English web site. Hamza was arrested in a street in the eastern Cairo district of Nasr City, two minutes after meeting Violit Dagher, the chairperson of the Paris-based Arab Commission for Human Rights. Dr. Dagher is currently in Cairo to continue her campaign protesting against sending Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leaders to the military tribunal. Doing a huge part of the file of the case of the MB leaders standing before the military tribunal, Ikhwanweb"s Cairo office has recently witnessed huge activities. To give the true picture of the case of the detained MB leaders, topped by engineer Khairat Al-Shater the second deputy chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood along with 39 MB leaders are tried, the Cairo office carried out a huge media coverage and activities which helped international, regional and local human rights organizations and activists get acquainted with the case as a whole . Engineer Hamza played an essential role in showing this military trial to the international public opinion wit his articles and reports which were published in several international periodicals . Hamza"s detention comes only a few days before the military tribunal holds its sentencing session to issue a ruling on the yearlong case. His detention aims to silence independent media voices from exposing the tyrannical and repressive practices of the regime, observers said. For his part, Dr. Ahmed Abdul Magid, the manager of Ikhwanweb"s office in London declared that such practices- Hamza"s detention- are expected from this repressive regime. "We will strongly miss the energetic Hamza, but Ikhwanweb will maintain its message from its other global offices.

The Islamist opposition online in Egypt and Jordan

By Pete Ajemian- arabmediasociety

January, 2008. An October report from Reporters without Borders indicates that the level of media freedom in both Egypt and Jordan has deteriorated over the past year following the jailing of several journalists and political activists in both countries.[i] This warrants a look at how opposition groups in these two states are using the internet to adapt to increasingly hostile print and television media environments. While Egypt and Jordan have relatively low internet penetration rates, 8.3%[ii] and 14.8%[iii] respectively, both countries are currently undertaking programs to promote and expand access, thus making online media activism increasingly relevant to political developments.[iv]
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has been raising its online profile at a time when the group is making limited gains in the official political process. In Jordan, regime policies have not been as hostile as in Egypt, but a series of recent measures limiting media freedom encouraged the Islamist opposition group, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), to launch an internet campaign supporting its candidates in the November 2007 elections. Although both groups share a Muslim Brotherhood ideological background, the use of the internet has varied between these two organizations, and is shaped by the organizational dynamics of these groups and the wider political context in which they function. Accordingly, while both the MB and the IAF have used websites to support short-term political objectives like election campaigns, the use of individualized online platforms such as blogs for media activism has been so far limited to the Egyptian MB. The IAF’s current internet strategy appears to be motivated by success at the polls rather than participating in broader liberal discourses enabled by new media. I suggest that while both countries have experienced setbacks in media freedom, the ways in which their respective Islamist opposition groups have utilized new media have played out differently according to factors internal and external to these groups as political actors. Furthermore, I argue that while new media technologies have provided some newfound benefits to opposition groups, they can bring potential challenges as well.
New media: Empowerment through convergence
To understand how online media enable opposition groups to establish counter-public spheres[v] of media discourse, one should look beyond the net’s increased interconnectivity, speed and its compatibility with networked organizations. Instead, the benefits of media convergence, bringing together print, video and broadcast in cyberspace, best explain how sub-state groups can circumvent their marginalization in mainstream media outlets. This phenomenon has shifted the power to create media content downward to a new range of small producers, while the reach enabled by new media shifts outward, allowing groups and individuals to transmit their media content to a global audience.[vi] Opposition group websites that feature print media, radio broadcasts and video footage are the technical side of media convergence. However, while websites have come to serve as an important resource for the dissemination of print and broadcast media, blogs best demonstrate how media convergence empowers individuals to shape media counter-public spheres.
Blogs intersect and compliment existing transnational media, allowing for dissident groups and their sympathizers to tap into the mainstream.[vii] Blogs also differ from websites in their low cost and user-friendly operability and maintenance. Some indicate that as a form of expression they have the potential to be a significant channel of ‘democratic’ discourse in Muslim contexts since blogging requires little technical knowledge, hosting can be free, and users can easily communicate widely with one other.[viii] At the same time, these individualized media platforms can cut against top-down leadership structures, and damage unity of message.
Despite the relatively low level of internet infrastructure in the Arab world, much of the new energy in Arab politics comes from a relatively small group of activists, and a technology that empowers their efforts could have a disproportionate impact even if it does not reach a mass base.[ix] Thus, the value of blogs as a form of new media is that they allow for individual grass roots political journalism and facilitate the creation of a counter-public sphere of discourse that has the potential to penetrate mainstream media. However, the impact of the integration of the Arab world into cyberspace will not be uniform and must be considered along with the social and political contexts in which actors use this technology towards their political agendas.[x]
The case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
The Muslim Brotherhood’s status in Egypt as an illegal organization has impeded its ability to issue media, while other political organizations recognized as legal political parties have been allowed to do so.[xi] To participate in elections, the Brotherhood skirts state restrictions by fielding independent candidates allied with secular opposition parties.[xii]
Media and open political activism have been at the center of the Brotherhood’s attempts to break into the Egyptian political mainstream. Precedent for such contestation exists in state policies towards print media, whereby ownership of the so-called “national press,” including the largest circulating daily newspapers, is in the hands of the Supreme Press Council and the Shura Council, an entity within Egypt’s upper house in parliament.[xiii] [see also Jeffrey Black’s article in this issue] And although Islamist political views have been catered to in the Labor Party’s publication Al-Shaab, it was suspended in 2003.[xiv] The regime’s historical control over media through such entities as the Supreme Press Council has been enhanced by the renewal of the state emergency law in April of 2006[xv] and antiterrorism laws introduced under Mubarak.[xvi] Members of the Brotherhood were, as recently as March of 2006, arrested for possessing anti-government publications and hiding printers and flyers.[xvii]
After the Egyptian regime closed down the official MB website in September 2004 the movement fought back by decentralizing its web presence to over eighteen separate sites promoting individual candidates.[xviii] In the run up to the 2005 presidential elections, activists began using the internet to organize demonstrations.[xix] The online media were incorporated into an overall campaign strategy that combined websites for each of its candidates with an internet radio station promoting the MB platform and the individual candidate sites.[xx] Part of this online campaign was meant to counter the control of the Egyptian Information Ministry and Television Union over the allocation of television broadcasts for parliamentary candidates; the MB launched an advertisement campaign explaining its election platform and the history of the group in a two hour video on its internet site.[xxi] The editor of the MB’s website stated that this was an effort to link the group’s leaders with the street since the Brotherhood was not allowed to appear on official television or terrestrial programs.[xxii]
In addition to mobilizing support for its electoral campaigns, the MB used websites to criticize and publicize election tampering. The most recent instance of this was during the 2007 Shura Council elections, when the Brotherhood claimed poll rigging and protested the detention of party members.[xxiii] In response to these activities the MB’s official website published articles in both Arabic[xxiv] and English[xxv] denouncing the measures against it. The Brotherhood’s official website also hosted video footage taken by hidden cameras allegedly depicting ballot box tampering at a number of the polling stations.[xxvi] But perhaps the most interesting development in the MB’s usage of internet-based media has been the entrance of the group into the blogosphere. As a convergent platform that enables individuals to utilize multiple media formats and penetrate other spheres of media discourse, the use of blogging by Brotherhood members has ushered in both new opportunities and challenges to the organization by empowering individuals to serve as both the vehicle behind and the face of the MB’s political media.
The Brotherhood enters the blogosphere
In recent years, the Egyptian regime has become more aggressive with security crackdowns on internet political activists, especially targeting the MB.[xxvii] Some argue that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood learned the power of blogging from the Kifaya movement, an alliance of opposition groups that relied heavily on the internet to coordinate demonstrations against the regime.[xxviii] The movement’s blogging began to have a political impact in Egypt in 2004-2005, bringing it to the attention of other opposition groups in Egypt. [xxix] In this sense, regime attempts to suppress activists and journalists have backfired, resulting in increased currency for both individuals and movements like the MB in Egyptian politics.[xxx]
Blogs have also enabled individuals in the Brotherhood to partake in opposition media activism. [xxxi] This is evident in how today’s younger Muslim Brothers are trying to adopt this technology to generate the kinds of solidarity, support and attention enjoyed by bloggers in other sectors of Egyptian society.[xxxii] In addition to individual bloggers, the MB maintains an official website, http://www.ikhwanonline.com/. The site works to raise party awareness with editorials recently featured on its website entitled, “Blogs of the sons of the arrested Brothers… shout out against the tyrants,”[xxxiii] “The slogans of the youth in the world of the internet: Enter Politics through the door of blogs,”[xxxiv] and “The Bloggers send a message of warning… we will speak our opinions out loud.”[xxxv] By the spring of 2007, the number of Brotherhood bloggers had risen from zero to around 150 in less than a year.[xxxvi]
As Brotherhood blogging surged, so did government arrests. Human Rights Watch reported that more than 1,000 members of the Brotherhood were detained between March of 2006 and March of 2007 and 800 remained imprisoned as of June 2007.[xxxvii] Yet the decentralized blogosphere remained online, with the Brotherhood’s main site serving as a central hub. The central site both framed the personal ordeals of individual members and heightened the effects of personal narratives using multimedia.
Abdul Galil al-Sharnoubi, the editor-in-chief of the Brotherhood’s official website, has called this “human element” a successful part of the Brotherhood’s online strategy. In an interview with Al Jazeera.net al-Sharnoubi described his approach as “making communications and contacts with various media, confirming that the most important element in the media equation is the human element, which the Muslim Brotherhood possesses.”[xxxviii] These personal narratives are enhanced by the fact that many of the younger bloggers are sons and daughters of imprisoned Muslim Brothers, thus giving the Brotherhood a human media face set against the backdrop of accounts of suffering under the Mubarak regime.
These compelling personal narratives often succeed in breaking-in to other media formats, as in the case of a blog dedicated to imprisoned MB member Hassan Malek,[xxxix] one of the movement’s leaders arrested in a February 2007 crackdown.[xl] Created by his eldest daughter Khadiga, the blog features videos dedicated to the portrayal of her father’s suffering. One of these segments posted on YouTube entitled, "Return my father,” depicts the pleas of his youngest daughter Aisha for her father's release from prison.[xli] But perhaps the most significant figure in the Brotherhood's blog culture has been Abdel Moneim Mahmoud, also a Brotherhood member detained early in 2007 for belonging to an illegal organization and defaming the Egyptian government.[xlii] Mahmoud originally saw his blog "Ana Ikhwan," which can be translated as "I am the Brotherhood," as a way to publish his experience of being imprisoned as a member of the MB.[xliii] While his blog presents a powerful Brotherhood-centered narrative of political events such as the military tribunals of Muslim Brothers and stories of members who have been targeted on his English language site, the level of visibility Mahmoud has achieved also embodies a challenge to the Brotherhood that blogging potentially poses: reformist minded individuals can now openly challenge the policies of the conservative organizational leadership.[xliv]
Challenges to organizational dynamics
The MB as a political entity has developed from a highly-secretive, hierarchical, antidemocratic organization led by anointed leaders into a modern, multi-vocal political association driven by educated, knowledgeable professionals.[xlv] The ability of blogs to empower the voices of more moderate, tech-savvy members may further threaten the authority of more conservative leaders. In his blog, Abdel Monem Mahmoud has leveled a series of critiques of the conservative aspects of the recently published draft of the Brotherhood’s program as a political party.[xlvi] These entries sparked a variety of responses, to which Mahmoud responded by arguing for a moderate and open agenda for the Brotherhood.[xlvii] This public display of internal disputes has been met with criticism from within the ranks of the Brotherhood.[xlviii] Indicative of how blogging has enabled moderate Muslim Brothers like Abdel Monem Mahmoud to publicly critique policies set forth by the group’s more conservative leadership, some suggest that this debate has even led to the withdrawal of the recently issued draft of the Brotherhood’s program.[xlix] The airing of this internal debate in cyberspace may portend coming challenges to organizational unity.
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Brotherhood Bloggers: A New Generation Voices Dissent

Khalil al-Anani; Egypt - arabinsight

Khalil al-Anani's "Brotherhood Bloggers" offers a glimpse into the new generation of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood youth, who have begun to use the medium of blogging, not only to promote Islamist ideas and values, but also to criticize the current Brotherhood leadership and voice dissent over certain Brotherhood policies. As al-Anani explains, this emerging trend threatens the very makeup of the Muslim Brotherhood unless its leadership addresses and engages these Brotherhood bloggers. Click here to open the article in pdf format

Blogging in the Arab World

by Mona Eltahawy

VELEN, Germany -- “If it’s longer than three days, I want this message to reach everyone. I don’t want to be forgotten in jail,” wrote Fouad al-Farhan, a 32 year-old Saudi, to a friend in anticipation of his detention. Now it's been almost a month since security forces picked him up at work, took him home to get his laptop, and then put him behind bars on December 10.Farhan’s “crime”: Blogging.How very telling that the Saudi authorities consider a blogger dangerous enough to be jailed. It is appalling that he is still detained without charge, but Fahran's ordeal is the latest example of a growing phenomenon in the Arab world: one person + one blog = one very angry dictator.Egypt imprisoned a blogger last year after convicting him of insulting Islam and President Hosni Mubarak. Other countries in the region have detained bloggers -- or threatened them and their families, or shut down their blogs.Why are bloggers so feared by authoritarian regimes in the Arab world? Because they are young and blogging is, at last, a way to express themselves in a world where they are ignored. The majority of the Arab world is under the age of 30 and this majority has few venues to express their views -- political or otherwise.In a story about the growing popularity of blogging in Saudi Arabia at the end of 2006, the journalist Faiza al-Ambah said there were at least 2,000 blogs in the Kingdom, and half were by women -- as far as we can tell.One of my earliest introductions to blogs was one simply called Saudigirl. At a conference on Arab media at the National Press Club in Washington DC in 2005, I quoted Saudigirl, who described herself as “young. Saudi chick. unveiled, unconservatized,” who had never voted, but who hoped one day “to walk in on a ballot box in jeans, t-shirt, and flip-flops so that everyone can see my pretty toes while I express my freedom.” I lost track of her blog for a while until on a whim I googled her last year to see how Saudigirl was doing. To my shock, it turned out Saudigirl had been Saudiboy all along. It was a case of “rhetorical transvestism,” confessed Ali K, the man who maintained the blog.What a bittersweet twist on the gender play of writers like George Sand or George Eliot and others who adopted male names, personae and wardrobes to splinter taboos. Here was a Saudi man pretending to be a woman so that he could impress upon his countrymen how difficult it was to be female.Fouad al-Farhan is a Saudi blogger who uses his name rather than a pseudonym, which made it easier for the authorities to get him. In the letter to his friend, he said they were after him because he "wrote about political prisoners in Saudi Arabia,” and had refused to sign an apology. "An apology for what? Apologize because I said the government lied when it accused those people of supporting terrorism," he said in the letter, posted in Arabic and English on his blog -- which continues to be updated by Farhan’s friends.Much has been said about how al-Jazeera and other satellite channels in the Arab world have triumphed overstate-owned media -- but it is one old man's voice challenging another. This so-called "new media" in the Arab world is still the old making little room for the voices of the young. And bloggers are mostly the young. And blogging is becoming powerful.Last November, a most powerful triumph of blogging took place in Egypt, when two police officers were sentenced to three years in prison for sodomizing a bus driver with a stick. Egyptian authorities were cornered into prosecuting the officers after public outcry and international media coverage. What caused both? Two bloggers posted a video clip of the assault that one of the officers had filmed using a mobile phone. The clip then made it to YouTube and was used as evidence against the officers during the trial.One of the bloggers who posted the clip was Wael Abbas, who last year became the first blogger to win the prestigious Knight Award for Journalism in recognition of how influential his blog has become in setting the news agenda in Egypt. Abbas has been threatened by security forces, and his YouTube account was shutdown for a few days. He believes it was by the Egyptian regime -- it reappeared after international media reported on YouTube’s action.I was in Cairo when the two police officers were sent to jail. Later that day, I led a discussion at the American University in Cairo about how girls and women use cyberspace to express themselves. Almost every student at the discussion had a Facebook account and many also had their own blogs.“Blogs give a voice to the voiceless,” one young woman said to explain why she started one.The Saudi regime's detention of Farhan only shows that growing power. Mona Eltahawy is an award-winning New York-based journalist and commentator, and an international lecturer on Arab and Muslim issues.

Day of Blog Silence for Fouad

by Mary

What? Day of Blog Silence to Protest the Imprisonment of Blogger Fouad Alfarhan
When? Sunday, January, 2008
Where? blogs around the world
How? On that day, bloggers will not write on their blogs, but instead will post a Free Fouad banner, like the one above. (Both banners are posted full-size at the bottom of this post.)

by Mary
Why? To free a blogger imprisoned for criticiznig his government and to send a message that we will not tolerate the persecution of free speech in the blogosphere.
Who is organizing the action? Mideast Youth

Fouad Alfarhan is a Saudi blogger who uses his blog, alfarhan.org, to promote political reform and greater freedom of expression in Saudi Arabia. He was forced to stop blogging at the beginning of 2007 after being harassed by government officials, but then resumed writing in July 2007. He was arrested without charge on Tuesday, December 11, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

To learn more about the campaign to free Fouad, please visit the Free Fouad Blog, which has content in both Arabic and English.

This action was organized by the progressive group Mideast Youth, which also runs the Free Kareem campaign to free jailed Egyptian blogger Abdel Kareem Nabil Soliman.